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Abstract
In this note I show that quadratic funding achieves decentralized so-
cial efficiency in the extent there are enough (donor) matching funds to
cover the quadratic funding objective. If individual backers internalize
that matching funds will not be sufficient to reach the quadratic level,
allocation will be biased towards the capitalist allocation, the more so,
the less matching funds are available. This result emerges even when
individual contributors are not required to finance the deficit (i.e., the
difference between total contributions and available matching funds). I
also show properties of the level of required matching fund, in order to
better understand under which conditions social efficiency will most likely
be compromised.
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Introduction
Buterin, Hitzig, and Weyl (2018) (BHW) propose a matching funding mecha-
nism that has the property of achieving (nearly) optimal provision of public
goods. The mechanism, they named Liberal Radicalism (LR), replicates the
(centralized) social optimum investment level, by means of decentralized coordi-
nation in the presence of an external philanthropic donor.
This promising mechanism has attracted a lot of public attention, and is cur-
rently under experimentation in Gitcoin Grants, an open source software and
Ethereum community-related projects financing platform.
Buterin, Hitzig, and Weyl (2018) have shown that if individual backers are re-
quired to finance the deficit between the LR rule financing level and the actual
funds committed by them, the mechanism will fail to achieve social efficiency.
This implies that the mechanism requires the availability of external or philan-
thropic funds to reach efficiency. In Gitcoin Grants, for example, the pool of
matching funds is collected from donors, and backers are not required to finance
the deficit.
My purpose in this note is to examine some properties of this mechanism, par-
ticularly in relation to its behavior under a limited pool of matching funds.
First, I note that even when project backers are not required to fund a deficit,
their investment will be lower than the optimal investment if they perceive that
available matching funds will not be enough to reach the optimal LR financing
levels.
In practice, as is the case with Gitcoin Grants, when the sum of required pay-
ments to each project exceeds available matching funds committed by donors,
the subsidies to each project are scaled down by a constant in order that totals
add up to the subsidy pool’s budget1. This procedure actually lowers the in-
dividual optimal contribution, biasing this response from the socially optimal
level.
I then examine the question of what determines the increase in the required size
of matching funds. I show how required funds increase non-linearly with the
number of contributors, a property that will probably put the efficiency of the
mechanism under stress in most applications. I also show that required funds
are maximized when backers have perfectly correlated investment shares across
projects.
1This is explained by Buterin in a blog post here:
https://vitalik.ca/general/2019/12/07/quadratic.html
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1 Sub-optimal investment under constrained
matching funds
The Liberal Radical Mechanism is a rule to allocate funding for public goods.
Assuming there are p ∈ P public goods candidates (and competing) to receive
financing, the LR mechanism is intended to allocate, for each project p, the
amount of funds F p,LR, where this amount is a function of (decentralized) indi-
vidual (i ∈ I ) contributions to project p, cpi :
F p,LR =
(∑
i
√
c
p
i
)2
This implies that the target LR matched subsidy to be provided to a project p
is:
Mp,LR = FP,LR − Cp
Where Cp =
∑
i c
p
i . In the context of Gitcoin Grants, matching funds are
collected from donors, conforming a subsidy pool we will denote D.2
In the practice, in order to meet the budget constrain, the actual matched
amounts received by each project are scaled down by a constant we will denote
k. So k results to satisfy the matching funds budget constrain, defined as:
1
k
∑
p
Mp,LR = D (1)
This implies that the actual funds to be received by the project (F p) are:
F p =
1
k
(F p,LR − Cp) + Cp = 1
k
F p,LR + (1− 1
k
)Cp
1.1 Individual contributor problem
As in Buterin, Hitzig, and Weyl (2018), let Vi(F
p) to be the currency-equivalent
utility citizen i receives if the funding level of public good p is F p. I also maintain
here the assumptions regarding the independence among values generated by
public goods across citizens, simultaneous timing, and a setting of complete
information.
The problem that defines the optimal individual contribution from the perspec-
tive of backer i is
max
{ci}
Vi
(
1
k
(
∑
i
√
ci)
2 + (1− 1
k
)Cp
)
− ci
2In the current Gitcoin rounds, the available pool is subsequently pre-divided into cate-
gories, such as infrastructure, applications (dapps ), and community, etc. For simplicity we
will abstract away from this.
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This problem has a first order condition given by:
V ′i (Fp)(
1
k
∑
i
√
ci√
ci
+ (1− 1
k
)) = 1 (2)
Notice that if k −→ 1 then the condition converges to:
V ′i (Fp) =
√
ci∑
i
√
ci
Which summing across individuals gives the socially optimal condition:
∑
i
V ′i (Fp) = 1
In other words, the marginal cost of investing 1 unit of contribution equals the
aggregate marginal benefit for the community.
Also notice that if k −→∞ in Equation 2, then
V ′i (C
P ) = 1
Which is the individual capitalist solution in the terminology of BHW.
2 What determines the size of the required
matching pool?
Since individual contribution suboptimality depends on the extent there are
insufficient funds available, it is useful to note under what conditions this will
most likely happen. Rearranging Equation 1, k is a function of
k =
∑
pM
p,LR
D
so for a given amount of contributed funds, k will be higher the higher the target
LR matched funding amount.
It is useful to notice that the level of LR subsidy a project p receives can also
be expressed as:
Mp,LR = (
∑
i
√
c
p
i )
2−
∑
i
c
p
i =
∑
i
c
p
i +2
∑
i6=j
√
c
p
i c
p
j−
∑
i
c
p
i = 2
∑
i6=j
√
c
p
i c
p
j (3)
Where the second equality results from a well known property of the sum of
squares. This expression is useful because the summation has a number of terms
equal to the number of pairs of contributors. So while the subsidy amount scales
linearly in the contributions of individuals, it scales non-linearly in the number
of contributors, which follow the combinatory number
(
n
2
)
= n!(n−2)!2! =
n(n−1)
2
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Therefore, it follows that, in order to keep k small, the level of contributions by
donors should scale as fast as the number of contributors, and this is certainly
demanding (if not impossible) for any pool of philanthropic funds.
A second observation is related to what determines the total target subsidy
to increase, considering, for example, if individual contributors have a given
budget to invest across projects. The answer in this case is that the subsidy
requirements will be maximized if the investment preferences, as measure by
their share of invested wealth, are perfectly correlated across individuals.
To see this, denote mi the total amount of available funds for individual i and
α
p
i the share contributed to project p , so
∑
p α
p
i = 1
The maximum subsidy results from solving the problem:
max
α
p
i
,i∈I,p∈P
2
∑
p
∑
i6=j
√
α
p
imiα
p
jmj +
∑
i
λi(1−
∑
p
α
p
i ) (4)
And the first order condition with respect to αpi is
2
1
2
(αpi )
− 1
2
√
miα
p
jmj − λi = 0, ∀i, p
In particular, if we take two conditions for projects p and p′ we have
(αpi )
− 1
2
√
miα
p
jmj = λi(α
p
′
i )
− 1
2
√
miα
p′
j mj = λi
And dividing each side of the each equation gives:
(
α
p
i
α
p′
i
)−
1
2 (
α
p
j
α
p′
j
)
1
2 = 1
Or alternatively:
α
p
i
α
p′
i
=
α
p
j
α
p′
j
Therefore, the total required subsidy is maximized when the invested shares
across individuals are perfectly correlated.
This result has the corollary that subsidy will be maximized under complete
coordination, for instance, if investments by all backers are allocated to a single
project, if all backers are coordinated to invest half of the investments in two
projects, and so on. In any of these cases the total (maximum) amount of
required funds will be given by
MLR, MAX = 2
∑
i6=j
√
m
p
im
p
j
Which is a similar expression to Equation 3 , and conserves the properties of
scaling linearly in terms of individuals wealth, and scaling non-linearly (quadrat-
ically) in the number of contributors.
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In contrast, the total subsidy is minimized in the case the invested shares are
perfectly non-correlated, as in a case where each individual invest in a separate
project. It is easy to see in Equation 4 that case would imply 0 matching funds.
3 Summarizing and preliminary conclusions
Buterin, Hitzig, and Weyl (2018) show a financing mechanism for public goods
with some promising features. My interest in this note is to further understand
some of its properties and practical limitations.
While BHW have shown that inefficiency is compromised under a requirement
to finance the matching pool, my focus here is in the case where funds come
from a separate philanthropic fund (no taxes to contributors), similarly to what
is is currently taking place at Gitcoin Grants.
Up to this point I’ve noted that, keeping the assumptions of preferences in
relation to the public good, the ability of the mechanism to achieve social effi-
ciency is tied to achieving a sufficiently large pool of matching funds. The lower
the restriction of funds, the greater its social efficiency. Given the quadratic
characteristics of the mechanism, however, this is especially difficult to occur
since the target LR financing increases non-linearly in the number of contrib-
utors -following the combinatorial
(
n
2
)
-. Asking for a similar increase in the
philanthropic pool of funds seems certainly difficult.
If conditions under which quadratic funding achieves social efficiency are so de-
manding, particularly under growth in the number of contributors, then perhaps
these results speaks about the impossibility of implementing practical mecha-
nisms that manage to replicate social efficiency in first place. But perhaps some
of the social efficiency assumptions made here might not be the most appropri-
ate in the first place. In particular in relation to the monotonically increasing
nature of the utility function or the absence of interdependences among projects.
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